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Linkage Dynamics between Small and Large firms in Kenya 
 Elijah Bitange Ndemo,PhD1 and David Smallbone, PhD2  
This paper is concerned with small enterprise development in developing countries, focusing on the 
question of the potential for using linkages with large enterprises as part of a strategy for the 
development of the small business sector. The paper will review existing literature and policy 
experience on this topic, whilst also reporting some results from a longitudinal pilot investigation, 
undertaken in Kenya in 2005 and in 2014. The paper will draw on empirical evidence from a 
longitudinal pilot investigation in Kenya. At least five large firms from different industries were 
purposively selected and a series of qualitative interviews conducted in 2005 and in 2014 to determine: 
1) their experiences in collaborating with micro and small enterprises (MSEs) and their assessment of 
the potential for doing so in the future; (2) groups of MSEs that they work with; 3) how they built the 
relationships and (4) whether or not the relationship has worked and the factors influencing this, from 
their perspective.  The potential benefits of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to host economies is 
summarised here and five main types of linkage and spillover effects, by which MNCs can affect the 
development of businesses in the host economy are identified: Backward linkages with suppliers, which 
can range from arms length market transactions to deep, long-term inter-firm relationships; Forward 
linkages with customers, such as marketing outlets, which may be outsourced, such as petrol stations 
and restaurant chains; Linkages with competitors, since foreign investors may set new standards, which 
local firms may seek to compete with; Linkages with technology partners, since some MNCs may initiate 
common projects with indigenous SME partners, which are an important potential source of technology 
and know-how for local firms; Other spillover effects, including demonstration effects, as inward 
investors demonstrate new and better ways of doing things to local firms and human capital spillovers, 
when, for example, trained personnel leave the inward investor to work for a local enterprise and/or set 
up their own business. The evidence of positive spillovers, where it exists, is strongest in the case of 
backward linkages, with local suppliers in developing countries. Positive benefits stem from the 
information, technical assistance and training provided by MNCs to help raise the quality of supplier's 
products and services. More generally, empirical evidence suggests that the positive spillover effects 
from FDI do not necessarily occur in practice, influenced by the specific conditions pertaining in the 
host country as well as the rationale for the foreign company making the investment. The implications 
for policy will be considered, paying attention to the potential role of national governments, in both 
developing and developed countries, as well as international development agencies.Whilst this is not a 
new topic, a number of recent trends suggest there may be greater scope for developing such linkages in 
the future than in the past. These include the emergence of new sources of FDI in developing and 
emerging economies themselves, increasing signs of SMEs internationalising their operations rather 
than simply exporting from their domestic base, as well as a continued increase in outsourcing by 
MNCs.  
Key Words: FDI; SME; Developing Economies, Impact of MNCs on SMEs, SME Linkages. 
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Introduction 
It is widely recognised(Moore, B. and 
Manring, S. (2009))that entrepreneurs and 
SMEs play an important role in economic 
growth and development, as well as 
contributing to poverty alleviation. At the 
same time, the nature and extent of this 
contribution varies between countries, 
reflecting differences in economic, social 
and institutional conditions, and ultimately 
the competitiveness of the SME sector. In 
this context, many transition and 
developing countries in particular, face a 
need to promote and strengthen the long 
term development of the SME sector, 
which requires access to market 
opportunities, as well as to new technology 
and management know-how, often in a 
situation of considerable resource scarcity  
This is a mainly review paper, based on 
existing literature and case material, 
concerned with the potential role of FDI in 
relation to the long-term competitive 
development and internationalisation of 
the SME sector in transition and 
developing countries. Whilst this is not a 
new topic, a number of recent trends 
suggest there may be greater scope for 
developing such linkages in the future than 
in the past. These include the emergence 
of new sources of FDI in developing and 
emerging economies themselves, 
increasing signs of SMEs 
internationalising their operations rather 
than simply exporting from their domestic 
base; the continued increase in outsourcing 
by MNCs; and a growing recognition by 
the international community of the 
importance of raising incomes levels in the 
African sub-continent in particular. Whilst 
such trends undoubtedly present 
challenges to SMEs in transition and 
developing countries, they also present 
opportunities (Smallbone, 2004). 
As in developed economies, the SME 
sector in developing and transition 
countries is typically very heterogeneous 
with respect to its size and sector 
composition, as well as growth orientation 
Although the details vary between 
countries, the SME sector in transition and 
developing economies includes petty 
traders; self-employed; and small business 
proprietors, many of whom operate at least 
partly in the informal sector; firms run by 
owners that may be better characterised as 
proprietors rather than entrepreneurs 
(Scase, 1997); as well as growth-oriented 
firms. Whilst the latter represent an 
important target group for policy makers, 
because of their leading role and 
disproportionate contribution to 
employment generation and economic 
development, the needs of other types of 
SME should not be ignored. Indeed, in 
relation to FDI-SME linkages specifically, 
a supply chain approach to policy, 
emphasising the interconnections between 
different types of enterprise could be 
rewarding, because of the importance of 
seeking to maximise the trickle down 
effects of any investment by, for example, 
a MNC. In this context, there may be 
opportunities for a wide range of small 
enterprises in the lower tiers of the supply 
chain. 
In this context, the purpose of this paper is 
to investigate the existence of different 
types of linkage between large 
multinational enterprises and SMEs in 
transition and developing countries whilst 
also reporting some results from a research 
investigation, undertaken in Kenya in 
2014.  Besides reviewing existing 
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literature and policy experience on this 
topic, we examine whether MNCs in 
Kenya have adopted strategies to work 
with these SMEs; whether such 
relationships are enabling SMEs to grow 
and the experiences of the relationships 
from a sample of five Multinational 
Corporations (MNCs).  
2. The Potential Benefits of FDI to 
SMEs in Developing Economies 
Foreign direct investment is an integral 
part of an open, international economic 
system and a major potential catalyst for 
development. This has been recognised by 
the OECD in a report, which focuses on 
maximising the benefits for inward 
investment, while recognising the possible 
costs and ways of reducing them (OECD, 
2002). The potential benefits of FDI for 
host economies include increasing the 
supply of capital; technology and 
knowledge transfer; the generation of 
employment and human capital; as well as 
the effect on enterprise development, 
through linkages and spillover effects. An 
additional source of capital is clearly 
important in countries where financial 
constraints act as a major barrier to 
development.  
In principle, supplier relationships with 
inward investors offer business 
opportunities for local firms. For 
developing countries, exploiting these 
opportunities can contribute to the 
development of a balanced structure of 
enterprise sizes emerging in an economy, 
in which economies of scale are combined 
with the flexibility of small enterprises. 
New markets are opened up for SMEs, by 
firms, which offer regular payment for 
goods and services, and through 
subcontract type relationships, relief from 
development and marketing costs for their 
SME sub-contractors (Altenburg, 2000).  
In terms of technology and knowledge 
transfer, FDI in developing countries may 
contribute to the upgrading of local 
suppliers through technical assistance, 
training and the transfer of knowledge. It 
may also contribute to increasing the rate 
of adoption of new technologies by local 
industries, as a result of processes of 
imitation and competition. In terms of 
employment, inward investors can 
generate new jobs directly, but they can 
also contribute to raising skill levels, 
because their skill requirements may be 
higher than those required by domestic 
firms.  At the same time, the extent to 
which MNCs actually facilitate such 
spillovers in practice has been shown to 
vary between sectors and contexts (OECD, 
2002). 
The potential benefits of FDI to host 
economies may be usefully summarised 
with reference to a framework developed 
by Dunning (1992), who identified five 
main types of linkage and spillover effects, 
by which the presence of MNCs can affect 
the development of businesses in the host 
economy. It serves as a conceptual basis 
for mapping SME potential linkages with 
MNCs.  Dunning referred to: 
(i) Backward Linkages with Suppliers: 
This refers to the extent to which 
components, materials and services 
are sourced from within the host 
economy, since this can create new 
market opportunities for local firms. 
Such linkages can range from arms 
length market transactions to deep, 
long-term inter-firm relationships. The 
productivity and efficiency of local 
suppliers can benefit from this type of 
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spillover as a result of direct 
knowledge transfer, higher quality 
requirements and increased demand 
levels. 
Forward Linkages with Customers: 
These can include marketing outlets, 
which may be outsourced. Examples 
include petrol stations and restaurant 
chains; and linkages with industrial 
buyers, through, for example, value 
added after-sales services. 
(ii) Linkages with Competitors: 
Foreign investors may set new 
standards, which local firms may seek 
to compete with. Although MNCs 
may hold a strong market position in 
relation to local firms, it should be 
noted that linkages with competitors 
may refer to second and third tier 
suppliers to leading inward investors, 
and not just linkages between first tier 
suppliers and the MNCs themselves. 
(iii) Linkages with Technology 
Partners: Some MNCs may initiate 
common projects with indigenous 
SME partners, including joint 
ventures, licensing agreements and 
strategic alliances, which are an 
important potential source of 
technology and know-how for firms in 
the host economy.  Whilst such co-
operation may be a more common 
feature of more mature market 
economies, the number of inter-firm 
technology agreements involving 
partners from developing countries 
rose in the 1990s compared with the 
1980s (UNCTAD, 1998). 
(v)  Other Spillover Effects: 
These includedemonstration effects, 
as inward investors demonstrate new 
and better ways of doing things to 
local firms, representing a source of, 
and stimulus to, innovation. They also 
include human capital spillovers, 
when, for example, trained personnel 
leave the inward investor to work for 
a local enterprise and/or set up their 
own business.  
At the same time, there can also be 
negative effects, for example, where local 
competitors are squeezed out, as a result of 
being unable to compete on price and/or 
on quality. This can be illustrated with 
reference to the Kenyan soap industry, in 
which Langdon reported the entry of 
foreign MNCs to be associated with low-
cost mechanised production, which led to 
local firms being unable to sell their 
handmade soap products in local urban 
markets (Langdon, 1981; Blomstrom M. 
1996).  
3. The Kenyan Context 
In order to provide a context in which the 
case study material may be interpreted, a 
brief summary of current conditions in 
Kenya with respect to inward investment 
and also the key characteristics of the SME 
sector are presented.    
3.1 Inward Investment 
According to Ngowi (2001), the African 
continent has been receiving the lowest 
share of global FDI inflows over time; in 
fact, the continent receives less FDI than 
Singapore (Bjorvatn 2000). This is despite 
the fact that FDI is welcome and actively 
sought by virtually all African countries. 
The continent did not benefit from the FDI 
boom that began in the mid- 1980s. Since 
1970, FDI inflows into Africa have 
increased only modestly, from an annual 
average of almost $1.9 billion in 1983-
1987 to $3.1 billion in 1988-1992, and $6 
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billion in 1993- 1997. For comparison 
purposes it should be noted that the global 
FDI flows in 1998 reached a record $644 
billion (UNCTAD 1999). 
In Kenya for example, the policy 
environment for FDI is encouraging, in 
view of the fact that the government has 
introduced measures to attract FDI, 
which include establishing the 
Investment Promotion Council (IPC) and 
the Export Processing Zone (EPZ), as 
well as tax and other trade incentives.  
Studies (see for example Ngowi 2001) 
show that tax exemptions, tax holidays or 
tax reduction for foreign investors, and 
similar incentives can play a positive role 
in attracting FDIs into a given destination. 
Other types of incentives include: 
guarantees against arbitrary treatment in 
case of nationalization; government 
provision of infrastructure; tariffs or 
quotas set for competing imports; 
reductions/elimination of import duties on 
inputs; interest rate subsidies; guarantees 
for loans and coverage for exchange rate 
risks; wage subsidies; training grants and 
relaxation of legal obligation towards 
employees.  
However, some of what is thought to be 
sufficient effort to attract FDI by Kenyan 
policy makers may not be adequate.  For 
example, UNCTAD’s 1998:91 World 
Investment Report presents some host 
country determinants of FDI, which 
include: 
Policy Framework for FDI: 
• Economic, political and social 
stability.  
• Rules regulating entry and 
operations (of FDIs).  
• Standard of treatment of foreign 
affiliates.  
• Policies on functioning and 
structure of the markets.  
• International agreement on FDI.  
• Privatization policy.  
• Trade policy (tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers and coherence of FDI and 
trade policy.  
• Tax policy. 
Economic Determinants: 
• Business facilitation:  
o Investment promotion 
(including image-building and 
investment-generating activities 
and investment –facilitating 
services)  
o Investment incentives.  
o Hassle costs (related to 
corruption and administrative 
efficiency)  
o Social amenities (for example 
bilingual schools, quality of life  
o After-investment services. 
(UNCTAD 1998:91) 
Most developing countries, including 
Kenya, have sought to put in place a range 
of measures designed to attract FDI.  
However, there still are problems that 
combine to hinder developing countries 
from increasing the volume of FDI they 
attract.  These include:  poor governance, 
inept legal systems, corruption, red tape 
and bureaucracy on the political front and 
poor national infrastructure (energy, water, 
roads and communication) and low 
domestic GDP on the economic front.  
Omuodo (2002) suggest that the legal and 
regulatory framework governing private 
business activities should be stable, 
transparent and reliable. The rules of the 
game must be reasonably stable and the 
judicial system able to enforce law and 
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contracts effectively and honestly. In 
Kenya, the judiciary is summarily corrupt, 
cases take longer than necessary to be 
concluded and a current constitutional 
review is in limbo. The investor’s main 
concern is a climate free from bureaucratic 
interferences, nit-picking controls and 
arbitrary decisions and a government 
whose basic approach is to facilitate rather 
than harass business.  
3.2 Characteristics of the SME Sector in 
Kenya 
Most enterprises in Kenya are very small.  
More than 90% employ less than 10 
employees (Ndemo 2001).  The sector is 
characterized with poor infrastructure, lack 
of financial resources, poor production 
capacity, low levels of health and safety 
standards, low awareness of environmental 
issues, lack of information that is essential 
for technology transfer process and 
dependence on large industries for the 
supply of raw materials, products, and 
technology.   However, the sector 
continues to provide the majority (94.3%) 
of the additional employment (Economic 
Survey 2004).  
As identified at a UNEP Round Table 
Discussion on knowledge sharing, SMEs 
in developing countries, including Kenya, 
are reluctant to change, often fearing that 
new technologies could possibly put them 
out of business (UNEP, 1995).  Since 
many of these enterprises fall within 
several clusters scattered throughout the 
country, the impact of reluctance to change 
can be concentrated, with major 
implications for local 
economies.(UNCTAD 2003).  It also 
makes it difficult to disseminate 
information where there are no clear 
channels such as industry organization.   
4. An Empirical Investigation in Kenya 
4.1 Methodology and Sources of Data 
Since the empirical investigation is of a 
pilot nature, the approach used is a 
qualitative one, based on a non-random 
purposive design, in order to gain in depth 
insights into the participant experience 
(Creswell 1998), detailing information 
regarding linkages between selected case 
study companies and local firms. 
Specifically, the study drew upon data 
gathered from senior executives in five 
different MNCs based in Kenya in 2005 
and in 2014.  The data gathering exercise 
focused on common and sectoral related 
links to SMEs.   
The research process first involved the 
identification of MNCs that had links to 
SMEs, followed by initial contacts being 
made to schedule an interview with the 
Chief Executive Officers, or one of their 
senior managers.  Prior to interview 
sessions, we reviewed each company’s 
literature (mostly Website based) and other 
relevant information to understand their 
operations.  Detailed semi-structured 
interviews were conducted.  For the 
purpose of clarity, we categorised SMEs as 
follows:  “micro” 10 or fewer workers 
(including working proprietors and 
working family members), “small” 
between 11 and 50 workers and “medium 
firms” with between 50 and 200 
employees.   
Initially, a total of seven large firms were 
approached through letters of introduction 
and a follow up telephone conversations to 
schedule appointments. Two of the firms 
we had approached at the initial stages 
declined to be included in the sample.  
DBA Africa Management Review 
March 2015, Vol 5 No.1, 2015. Pp 38-59

DBA Africa Management Review

Two CEO and three senior managers were 
the main respondents in 2005 although 
while analyzing the data, other officers 
assisted in follow up interviews that were 
necessary to verify the validity and 
reliability of the data (Lincoln and Guba 
1985).  In 2014, three chief executive 
officers and one General Manager were 
the respondents.  One MNC declined to 
take the second interview.  The aim of the 
research was to solicit for strategic 
responses with respect to the research 
questions:  What are the linkage dynamics 
between SMEs and large firms?  And what 
has changed significantly over the past 
eight years.  In other words, the large 
firm’s experiences with SMEs over the 
past few years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In view of the qualitative, in-depth nature 
of this research, the authors recognize that 
the small sample size, the regional focus of 
the study, together with the early stage of 
the pilot research, mean that the findings 
must be viewed in context (Henry et al 
2004).  As a consequence, we shall not 
attempt to generalize the findings, but 
rather treat the cases as individual events 
from which evidence and themes can be 
drawn. 
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Table 1: Summary of Firm Profiles 
Firm Industry/Ow
ner 2005 
Industry/Ow
ner 2014 
Yr. Of Est. Resp. 2005 Resp. 2014 SME Link 2005 SME Link 2014 
Kenya Shell (BP) Oil 
Anglo/Dutch  
Vivo Energy 1900 Shell started operations 
in Kenya. 
1928 Merger with British 
Petroleum (BP) & became 
consolidated Petroleum 
Company 
1961 re-separated into Kenya 
Shell Ltd and BP Kenya Ltd, 
a marketing joint venture 
managed by Shell. 
Corporate Affairs 
Manager 
Chief Executive 160 Retail Stations 
employing between 20 
and 50 staff. 
2 Distributors 
20 Resellers 
Outsourced: 
Transportation (200) 
staff 
Engineering and 
Professional services 
(300 staff) 
Travel/Security and 
other (200 staff) 
Several retail stations 
Safaricom/Vodaf
one 
Communication 
Kenya/British  
Communication 
Kenya/British 
1997 by the Kenya Telcoms. 
2000 Vodafone bought 40% 
shareholding. 
2005 Vodafone bid to acquire 
majority shareholding. 
Chief Executive General Manager 62 Dealer with an 
average of 4 Sub 
dealers each supplying 
to more 6000 SMEs. 
Outsource services 
such as cleaning to 
SMEs. 
84,743 Dealers and 
Agents 
Outsource services such 
as cleaning and security 
to SMEs employing 
hundreds. 
American 
International 
Group (AIG) 
Kenya 
Insurance 
American 
Insurance 
Became Kenyan 
after 2008 
Financial Crisis 
1967 as Kenya American 
Insurance Company; 
1987 Changed to American 
Life insurance Company 
(ALICO); 
2004 Sold Life business and 
became AIG. 
Chief Executive Chief Executive 40 Brokers employing 
between 10 and 40 
staff. 
200 Agents 
Outsource legal, loss 
assessors, loss 
adjusters, garages and 
other supplies. 
Expansion into rural 
areas pushed the 
number of Brokers and 
Agents to over 500.  
Outsource legal, loss 
assessors, loss adjusters, 
garages and other 
supplies. 
Unilever Kenya Consumer Goods 
Anglo/Dutch 
Consumer Goods 
Anglo/Dutch 
1943 as East African 
Industries (EAI). 
1956 Bought by Unilever and 
a minority share by the Kenya 
Government through ICDC 
but retained EAI name. 
2000 Became Unilever 
Kenya. 
Distribution Manager Declined 
Interview 
45 Key Distributors 
(KD) with an average 
of 40 retail outlet for 
each KD. 
Out sources services 
such as Market 
research and 
manufacturing of 
certain consumer 
goods.  
Declined Interview  
General Motors 
Kenya  
Motor  
American/Kenyan/ 
Japanese 
 
Motor  
American/Kenyan/ 
Japanese 
1975 with minority 
shareholding by Government 
of Kenya investment arm 
ICDC (37.8%) and Itochu of 
Japan (4.4%). 
Corporate Affairs 
Manager 
Chief Executive 7 Dealers in Kenya 
and 5 others from the 
region (finished 
products.) 
Outsourcing of parts 
and service from 
SMEs 
18 dealerships in Kenya 
and 8 others in the 
region 
Outsourcing of parts 
and service from SMEs 
directly benefiting more 
than 20,000 people 
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4.2 Preliminary Findings 
Presentation of the following findings takes 
the form of a brief summary of each case, 
followed by a discussion summarising 
emerging themes.  Five case studies drawn 
from different industries are presented in 
Table 1 below. These are: the oil (Vivo), 
communication (Vodafone/Safaricom), 
insurance (AIG Group), consumer goods 
manufacturing (Unilever) and motor 
(General Motors Corporation) industries. 
Vivo Energy previously Kenya Shell Ltd / 
BP Kenya Ltd 
The oil industry has very strong forward 
linkages with SMEs through extensive 
investments in distribution outlets, which 
they franchise to small and medium 
entrepreneurs.  Most of the business in the 
oil industry is done through retail outlets.  
Vivo for example, has developed has 
increased its outlets to 180 up from 160 in 
2005 and fully outsourced its transportation 
and engineering business.Its retail 
enterprises have fully adopted international 
best practices enhancing strict international 
safety standards for storing highly 
inflammable products.  In some of the retail 
outlets, it has built convenience stores for 
dealers to enable them to increase revenues 
and margins given the fact that there is 
increasing pressure on oil prices 
internationally. 
‘‘We create value to our partners.  It is the 
reason why you see many of our partners 
being highly successiful.  We ensure they are 
taken care of because if compromise their 
success, we can compromise on our strict 
international standards.  We therefore help 
them to set up service related businesses to 
complement the fuel sales at the same time 
satisfying the customer needs.” 
All outlets are branded and as a result, the 
company maintains its competitiveness and 
values through strict requirements. These 
include:  sales volume targets, health safety 
and environmental standards, training 
requirements, credit controls and stock 
management.  On staff management, the 
dealers are required to pay at least minimum 
wage, provide job descriptions and maintain 
clean uniforms.  This was confirmed by a 
senior manager. 
‘We make sure that the people we lease our 
stations to, are trainable because training is 
key to our success.  Minimum educational 
requirement to operators is at least “O” 
Levels.  Some of the courses that we 
emphasize include: management skills, 
safety and product promotion.  As a result 
we have managed to standardize our service 
throughout the branch network’. 
The company meets the marketing and 
promotion costs, training both the dealers 
and their staff, and in some cases provides 
soft loans to some of their dealers to 
purchase equipment.  Outside of its core 
business, the company is involved in some 
social responsibility projects, mainly in the 
areas of education, poverty eradication, 
health, environmental protection and safety.  
In addition to retail station dealers, the 
company distributes its lubricants and 
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) through 
appointed distributors, who may or may not 
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be branded.  These distributors have a 
network of resellers mostly micro 
entrepreneurs spread throughout the country. 
On average most outlets make between 2 
and 3 pence per litre of petrol.  Unless the 
volumes are high, some do not make 
sufficient income.  Over the years, the 
company has established that a dealer needs 
to sell at least 80,000 litres per month to 
break even. A higher volume may be 
required to break even in urban areas due to 
higher labour costs. The appointed dealers 
are required to meet target volume sales. 
These targets are set after a thorough 
analysis of the location potential.  On few 
occasions some have lost dealership due to 
not meeting company requirements. 
For many years, the oil industry was not 
liberalized.  There were few players in the 
market, of whom most were multinationals.  
However, recent market liberalization has 
necessitated a number of small players to set 
up their own enterprises.  Some of these 
entrepreneurs were former employees of 
multinational organizations, including Shell.  
Some of the new gas stations benefit from 
locally available engineering knowledge 
built from many years of working for MNCs 
in the sector. 
Vodafone/Safaricom  
Mobile communication is a recent 
phenomenon in Kenya but has created an 
enormous economic impact, providing jobs 
to thousands of people; contributing 
substantial revenue to the Government; and 
importing technology within a very short 
period of time.  This could not have been 
achieved without creating international 
linkages, with Vodafone and local linkages 
with SMEs.  Communication previously a 
luxury to many Kenyans is now affordable. 
‘Our subscriber base grew 2.7 million in 
2005 to 21 million in 2014 and new products 
such as Mpesa that we started in 2007, has 
more than 19 million customers.  Our 
growth has been phenomenal and our story 
can be told by our partners because they 
have benefited most. 
Although Safaricom could very easily 
develop direct access to customers through 
its own managed retail shops, it chose to 
deal with a network of small suppliers.  This 
has not only worked but has created a 
significant impact growing from 62 
dealerships to 84,743 (See chart below).  
Each of the 84,743 dealers has an average 5 
employees and further link to at least 4 sub-
dealers who in turn sell to more than 6,000 
micro enterprises throughout the country.  
The role of retail outlets runs parallel to 
dedicated dealers, but with more focus on 
customer service purposes. 
‘Our distribution model has largely worked 
because we have involved everybody and 
sharing our success with real Kenyans on 
the street.  In turn we have created trust with 
the people of Kenya.  We have almost 90 
percent of the premium services in this 
country coming from young and innovative 
Kenyans.  We shall continue with providing 
innovative products and hope that we 
continue to work with our partners”.  
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Figure 1: Growth of Number of Dealerships for 
 
The company has regular meetings with 
dealers, requiring them to attend seminars 
and all training programmes.  Dealership 
staff are also required to undergo training 
regularly.  More importantly, the dealers are 
supposed to espouse the company values.
‘Our success is as a result of high ethical 
standards that we have maintained either 
when hiring or procuring any goods or 
services’. 
All dealer shops are branded and are 
supposed to maintain similar layout and 
other standards.  Company staff checks 
frequently if the standards are maintained.  
Besides conducting consumer surveys, the 
company’s field staff uses the distribution 
network to obtain feedback from customers.
‘Our dealers are of great importance to us 
as they are the face of Safaricom to the 
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ordinary customer who walks into their 
outlets to purchase a products or make an 
enquiry on particular services from 
Safaricom’. 
Safaricom also has backward linkages with 
SME suppliers that provide many essential 
services, such as repairs and maintenance of 
their systems; cleaning services; and other 
supplies.  Evidence of other spillovers 
including the knowledge gained from 
training by suppliers of technology is 
apparent as many of the dealers not only sell 
the product but are able to explain highly 
complex mobile telephony technologies.  
In turn, the partners take home a huge junk 
of Safaricom success in commissions and 
other stakeholders (see chart below).  
Safaricom is the largest company by revenue 
today in East and Central Africa.  It has 
created real entrepreneurs in its partnership 
programme. 

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Figure 2: Commissions paid by Safaricom
The total value allocated to partners include that of dealers and other small enterprises that 
provide essential services to the compa
Figure 3: Total Value Allocated to Safaricom Partners
AIG Kenya 
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AIG Kenya formerly American Life 
Insurance Company (ALICO) deals with 
General Insurance after its life division was 
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sold to a local consortium (an amalgamation 
of three medium enterprises) after the 2008 
global financial crisis.  AIG decided to focus 
on the general insurance market, because of 
the declining growth in Life insurance 
coupled with the strategic change to focus 
on general insurance in Africa, risk in life 
insurance was too much to bear considering 
the fact that a number of policy holders in 
the Kenyan context were infected with 
HIV/AIDs.  Since 2005 a lot has changed.  
AIDs infection rates have dropped, there are 
new medicines to prolong the lives of AIDS 
patients.  But even with the emerging 
development, AIG remains a General 
Insurance company.   
After the spin off, AIG is now focusing its 
strategy on core business and out-sourcing 
non-core business activity to SMEs and 
developing new products by targeting 
partnerships with micro financial services 
providers. These new products have enabled 
the company to expand into rural areas 
where they are discovering new customers.  
They see this as an area of growth and one 
they want to dedicate a number of agents to.  
With a lean staff of 100, the company has 
managed to remain the second largest 
general business insurance company by 
working through brokers and agents.  The 
company pays more attention to about 80 
brokers as they bring more than 80% of the 
business to the company.  Although the 
brokers do not sell AIG brand, the amount 
of information passed to them is sufficient to 
sell AIG before considering any of the 
competitors. 
‘We have maintained our reputation for 
paying claims uniquely on time and that is 
why an honest broker will sell AIG first.  All 
of our brokers have service level agreement 
and they know our ideals and speed with 
which we deal with our customers’. 
Whenever there is change of direction with 
respect to their product, AIG ensures that all 
brokers and their staff (number of 
employees for each broker range between 5 
and 100) are trained and know the product 
well.  Most of the more than 200 agents who 
sell AIG products undergo rigorous training 
and have access to all materials with respect 
to the company products offered.   
‘In future we may have dedicated agents 
selling only our brand but for now we are 
satisfied with the present set up.  Managing 
dedicated agents in a third world may not be 
easy because they may actually sell 
competitor products on the side’. 
The company does not have its own loss 
assessors and adjusters instead, it out 
sources the services from the SME sector.  
They have confidence in these service 
suppliers as they learnt their trade from 
previous employment with MNCs before the 
onset of restructuring and refocusing on core 
activities. 
‘These people are not just Jua Kalis (micro 
entrepreneurs that often work out in the 
sun); they have the experience and know 
how to do the job at the lowest cost possible.  
Most of these people were one time 
employees of MNCs’. 
Other services out sourced include legal 
services, garages and other suppliers.  The 
company prefers small firms to large firms 
because of their efficiency and effectiveness.  
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Experience has taught them that larger 
enterprises sometimes cause them losses.  
For example, in garages where they refer 
client vehicles for repair, smaller ones pay 
more attention to the problem and in most 
cases would do it within a reasonable time 
and charge fairly. 
Unilever Kenya 
After several attempts to meet with the 
senior leadership of Unilever failed, we 
decided to leave the 2005 information.  This 
is because it is still relevant in terms its 
linkage with local SMEs.  Unilever is one of 
the largest fast moving consumer goods 
(FMCG) companies in the world.  In Kenya 
it distributes its products throughout the 
country via 45 appointed and dedicated key 
distributors (KD), each serving between 500 
and 600 retail outlets.  The retail outlets are 
not obligated to only sell Unilever products, 
although the KD must ensure that all 
Unilever supplies required by retailers are 
supplied when and where they are needed.  
Major super markets buy their products 
directly from the company. 
The demands on the KDs are varied 
including: adequate transport (usually 4 -5 
distribution vans), adequate stock levels 
with a replenishing plan, a route map to 
ensure that all places are covered and 
regular reports to ensure target volumes are 
achieved.  In addition the KDs must be 
available and their staff for regular training 
seminars and also assist the company with 
promotions in their respective territories.  
“Each KD is reviewed annually using 
measures such as sales volume, coverage 
and how effectively they have managed their 
respective territories. Majority of them 
understand our work ethic”. 
The company manufactures most of its 
brands.  However, it has started to contract 
out manufacturing services to small 
companies in tea packing and corn flour 
milling.  These companies have to meet the 
strict quality standards, volume and delivery 
targets set by the company.  The majority of 
marketing products such as posters, t-shirts 
and other promotional materials as well as 
services are sourced from local SMEs often 
set up by former employees of the company. 
Other services contracted out include: 
laundry and canteen services to former 
employees of the company. 
The KDs are the company’s foot soldiers, 
who gather information with respect to 
competitor activity and other market 
dynamics.  In return the company has 
invested enormous resources in stock 
management software, Tally which links the 
company directly to all KDs.   
Tally tells us everything about stock 
movement at the regional KD’s warehouses.  
We sometimes get to know some things with 
respect to stock movement before the KD is 
aware of it. This system is very important to 
us because of the counterfeit products in the 
market. 
The company also sets rules for those of 
whom they have backward linkages with.  
Some of the rules include: hiring people of 
high calibre and good morals, ensuring high 
standards of health, safety and the 
environment they work in and maintaining 
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international standards that the company is 
reputed for. 
Our inspectors go round sampling all 
products manufactured on contract outside 
of our premises to ensure that we maintain 
international standards. 
The company is aware of counterfeit 
products coming from Asia, which they are 
fighting through incentives to KDs.  
Unilever Kenya started cutting costs, 
through a total productivity maintenance 
(TPM) programme, which is a Japanese 
management model that seeks to cut 
production costs by ensuring that workers do 
the right thing at the right time and at the 
right place. In 2000, savings from this 
programme have enabled the company to 
give higher margins to KDs, thus making it 
harder for counterfeiters to use the normal 
distribution systems. 
The company that once had more than 3,500 
employees now employs about 800 people, 
as a result of out-sourcing most of its non 
core functions.  In 1995, for example, it 
entered into an agreement with Tibbett and 
Britten Kenya Limited (T&B) which, is part 
of the United Kingdom based Tibbett and 
Britten Group Plc, to provide warehousing 
and distribution services.  Although T&B is 
not a local company, it brought expertise to 
its Kenyan workers who have now branched 
off to set up their own services.  
General Motors Kenya 
General Motors East Africa (GMEA) has 
grown its dealer network to cover East, 
Central and Southern Africa.  It provides 
core support to each dealership in the region.  
The company is 57.8% owned by General 
Motors Corporation (GMC) of USA.  Other 
shareholders include ICDC 20%, ICDC 
Investments (17.8%) and Itochu of Japan 
(4.4%).  Since its inception in 1975, the 
company has expanded to cover the regional 
market.  The plant, assembles three brands, 
namely Izuzu and Chevroret and Opel.  
Several SMEs provide up to 60% content for 
some models assembled. 
‘Since 1975, we have seen most of these 
suppliers grow from micro enterprises to 
where they are now.  Some of them like the 
two large body builders are no longer small 
enterprises’. 
In most cases the company imports the 
engine and chassis, while the majority of 
vehicle parts are manufactured by different 
small and medium enterprises.   Due to tax 
incentives encouraging local assembling of 
vehicles, motor imports that cannot be 
manufactured locally are imported as 
completely knocked down (CKD) kits then 
assembled at the plant.  Body building for 
most of the vehicles is done by various small 
and medium enterprises. 
As part of maintaining high standards of 
quality, GMEA is ISO 9001:2000 and ISO 
14001 certified: the best known testimonials 
to world class quality and environmental 
standards respectively and has encouraged 
all its sub contractors to aspire towards ISO 
certification.  To provide highest quality all 
employees of the company and the dealers 
have to go through training regularly.  It has 
a unique problem in its relationship with 
local builders who have grown too big.  
Training sometimes become a problem. 
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We have for example tried to improve the 
quality of body building locally but failed 
because the large body builders see no 
reason since the market takes whatever they 
make.  We invited Marcopolo (Builds more 
than 50 percent of coaches in Brazil) from 
Brazil to train but that did not work.  This I 
guess are the problems you get when your 
partners grow too big. 
The company has however maintained 
continued training programme for many 
other builders and mechanics in the 
burgeoning vehicle industry in Kenya. 
‘We have an established a customer care 
and dealer training centre to provide service 
benchmarks throughout the dealer network.  
The service you get in Nairobi is the same as 
in Kampala’. 
The more than 30years’ experience, or more, 
in local assembly and service is paying off 
as its market is expanding to neighbouring 
countries and some as far away as 
Mozambique.  The outcome is increased 
FDI to meet the growing demand.  At the 
same time its extensive technology transfer 
from GMC is developing the motor industry 
in Kenya.  Skills developed over time are 
benefiting new competitors in the industry.  
Large investment in ultra modern service 
centers with state of the art equipment and 
skilled personnel now characterize some its 
activities in the region. 
GMEA is at the forefront lobbying the 
Government to create a fair playing field.  
Although the Government encourages local 
assembly through tax incentives as a way of 
employment creation, the incentives are not 
sufficient to fight off imported used cars 
from Japan.  The company is at the forefront 
fighting the dumping of used cars into the 
Kenyan market and has suggested that an 
anti-dumping tax is required coupled with 
favourable policies for local manufacturers. 
The argues that local manufacturers create 
local jobs. 
5. An Overview of MNE-SME Linkages 
in Common Linkage Practices 
Dunning’s (1992) framework reviewed 
earlier in the paper, which was used to guide 
the structure of the data collection, is used to 
summarise case study results. 
5.1 Backward Linkages 
The international evidence of positive 
spillovers, where it exists, is strongest in the 
case of backward linkages, with local 
suppliers in developing countries. This can 
be illustrated with reference to 
manufacturing firms, such as Unilever and 
GMC in Kenya. Positive benefits stem from 
the information, technical assistance and 
training provided by MNCs to help raise the 
quality of supplier's products and services 
(OECD, 2002). All five cases in the study 
are focusing more on their core-
competencies, and outsourcing some of the 
administrative and business services, which 
have previously been provided in-house.  
Through backward linkages, services like 
cleaning, legal, maintenance, canteen, health 
and market research are being taken up by 
SMEs.  Manufacturers have gone further 
and contracted assembly operations, 
warehousing as well as transportation. 
5.2 Forward Linkages 
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Empirical evidence suggests that MNCs 
adopt certain strategies to relate to 
customers through SMEs as intermediaries.  
The most common of this link among the 
five firms was the development of marketing 
outlets to start off SMEs.  Vivo Energy and 
GMC for example, have invested substantial 
resources in the physical structures of their 
marketing outlets.  Altenburg in particular 
argued that MNCs “which outsource the 
distribution of brand name products often 
make considerable investments in the 
performance of their marketing outlets, e.g. 
automobile dealers, gas stations, restaurant 
chains and travel agencies.”(Altenburg 
2000:II)   For BP, the investment has made 
it possible for them to expand their market, 
develop standardised products, and at the 
same making significant contributions 
towards the growth of SMEs through 
capacity building.   
5.3 Linkages with Competitors 
According to Altenburg (2000), competition 
is the main driving force for technological 
learning.  As a result, the presence of a 
major player, such as Unilever, in the 
market increases the efficiency of both large 
and small competitors.  Unilever for 
example, has had a significant impact in the 
development of some of its competitors like 
Bidco Oils, who have improved their 
production of oils to the extent that it 
acquired Unilver’s major brand, KIMBO.  
Altenburg suggests that MNCs entering a 
developing country’s market may induce 
competing companies to accelerate 
improvements.  
5.4. Linkages with Technology Partners 
In a global market economy, strategic 
alliances enable business to gain competitive 
advantage through access to a partner's 
technologies, capital and people enabling 
junior partners to grow and expand faster 
and efficiently.  Fast growing company like 
Safaricom had to rely heavily on Vodafone’s 
technology and resources to sustain its 
phenomenal growth.  Empirical evidence 
show that the number of inter-firm 
technology agreements involving partners 
from developing countries rose in the 1990s 
compared with the 1980s (UNCTAD, 1998). 
5.5 Other Spillover Effects 
Spillovers such as human capital occur 
whenever MNCs train personnel beyond 
their own needs (Altenburg (2000) and 
Crespo, N. and Paula, M. (2007)).  A 
number of former employees in all the cases 
have moved to either work for companies in 
the supply chain, or have started their own 
companies to benefit from either backward 
or forward linkage with MNCs.  Former 
GMEA employees are helping small 
companies (sub-contracted by GMEA) to 
meet the quality standards required by the 
company.  Even if MNC employees do not 
participate in training activities, they may 
acquire certain skills, attitudes and ideas just 
be working in a plant that conforms to 
international production standards 
(Altenburg (2000).  
Table 2 below shows the types of services 
outsourced from SMEs, since the trend in all 
the five organizations is to increasingly 
concentrate on core competencies.  Some 
services like Market research in two 
organizations are undertaken by former 
employees who set up small enterprises to 
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offer the services.  Canteen services that 
were previously offered by the companies 
are either provided by former employees, or 
by other small enterprises in the industry. 
Table 2: Services Outsourced 
Service Number of Organization 
Equipment Maintenance 5 
Cleaning services 5 
Manufacturing/Parts 2 
Canteen 5 
Training 4 
Legal 5 
Market Research 2 
Health Services 5 
Sales 4 
5.6 Long term FDI benefits 
The Chinese utilization of FDI offers longer 
term perspectives on FDI benefits.  Their 
FDI strategy entailed four stages.  In Stage I, 
firms established assembly plants in China 
to benefit from low wages and exported the 
final product. In Stage II, some low-end 
imported components were made within 
China and the infrastructure and expertise to 
make other inputs were developed. In Stage 
III, all inputs to the assembly plant were 
mostly made in China, with access Chinese 
markets. The final product is assembled for 
both exports and internal consumption. 
Stage IV involved the globalization of the 
Chinese firms itself. Chinese firms will be 
able to establish foreign subsidiaries and 
export components from China to these 
subsidiaries thus capturing a larger fraction 
of the global value chain. The massive 
backward linkages in Stages II to IV have 
created numerous jobs and contributed to 
raising disposable incomes, which in turn 
have helped to increase internal 
consumption of goods and services. Most 
large firms in China are nearing Stage III 
(Konana et al 2005). 
6. Conclusion and Implications for Policy 
6.1 Conclusion 
The pilot nature of the empirical 
investigation reported in this paper limits the 
extent to which firm conclusions may be 
drawn from it and makes policy 
recommendations that are specific to the 
Kenyan context inappropriate. However, 
what the cases show is that MNC-SME 
linkages can offer some benefits to local 
firms, in practice, with capacity building 
effects. In each case, MNCs imported 
technology from their home countries. 
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Some, especially those involved in 
manufacturing, sought backward linkages 
with local SMEs to procure part of their 
product content and service.  All of the five 
cases sought forward linkages through either 
finishing the product or packaging it for the 
market.  Some local benefits such as 
influence on competition, human capital and 
technology partnerships can be directly 
attributed to these companies.   
At the same time, a larger scale and more 
comprehensive investigation is required in 
order to fully assess the scale of these 
impacts; the specific effects on supplying 
companies; any negative impacts at a macro 
level, such as, crowding out effects; and any 
change in inter-firm relationships and 
linkages over time. Perhaps the main 
conclusion from this work is that it shows 
sufficient evidence of linkage benefits, to 
justify a more in-depth investigation, in a 
context where the SME sector is 
experiencing demand-side deficiencies, 
combined with a need for technological and 
knowledge upgrading, in a situation of 
resource scarcity.  
The extent to which potential positive 
externalities from FDI are likely to be 
achieved in practice is affected by a variety 
of factors at the macro- and micro- levels, 
including the general climate for business 
development and the strategies used by 
individual MNCs. In this regard, it is 
important for policy makers to recognise 
that any investment by a foreign company 
has to make business sense, without 
depending on support from publicly funded 
initiatives. In addition, spillovers of 
technology and human capital do not follow 
automatically from foreign investment, since 
these are affected by sectoral and domestic 
external conditions, together with the 
potential capacity of local SMEs to take 
advantage of any new market opportunities 
presented. In general, human capital 
spillovers from FDI in developing countries 
appear to be mainly indirect, occurring more 
as a result of government policies seeking to 
attract FDI through enhanced human capital, 
than directly from MNCs themselves. 
However, human capital spillovers can 
occur where FDI involves acquisition of a 
local firm by a foreign company.  
Whilst there are ‘a priori’ arguments to 
support the potential role of FDI-SME 
linkages between enterprises as a 
development strategy in developing 
countries, and some positive case examples, 
empirical evidence suggests that the 
potential benefits do not always materialise. 
For example, there is some evidence to 
suggest that some SMEs in transition and 
developing countries have experienced the 
negative effects of foreign companies 
seeking co-operation partners as a short-
term expedient, faced with uncertain local 
market conditions. Such firms may 
experience few of the learning benefits and 
capacity building that is one of the 
justifications for this type of strategy in the 
longer term, from the standpoint of the 
partner in the host economy. One question 
that arises concerns the factors, which 
influence the ability of partner companies to 
co-operate effectively, with sustainable 
mutual benefits, particularly where the 
partners are drawn from different national 
and cultural environments. In this context, 
good practice illustrative cases are required 
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in order to be able to analyse the key 
elements in successful partnerships of this 
type.  
6.2 Implications for Policy 
Although it is premature to draw policy 
implications from the Kenyan pilot study, 
the wider knowledge base does enable 
certain policy implications to be drawn. 
Whilst FDI represents a potential means of 
growing and diversifying the SME base in 
developing countries, whether or not this 
potential is actually achieved in practice, 
depends on a variety of factors, some of 
which are under the influence of policy 
makers. An essential prerequisite in this 
regard is the creation of a facilitating 
environment for all businesses in developing 
countries, since this is necessary in order to 
encourage both foreign and domestic 
investment. 
One of the key factors that policy makers 
need to consider, in seeking to attract and 
exploit the potential benefits of FDI, is the 
large number of locations in the world with 
similar characteristics, which clearly affect 
the bargaining position of individual 
governments with potential investors. In the 
absence of other location advantages, 
competition between places typically 
focuses on offering lower costs, which can 
contribute to the so-called ‘race to the 
bottom’. As with business strategy, 
competition between places based on non-
price advantages is ultimately more 
sustainable than that based on price alone, 
which emphasises the importance of policies 
that seek to upgrade local economies in 
terms of infrastructure, human capital and a 
competitive potential supply base. 
Key policy issues relate to creating the 
conditions to attract foreign investors in the 
first place, together with policies to 
encourage and facilitate different forms of 
co-operation between inward investors and 
domestic SMEs. Defining the role for policy 
to attract FDI includes promotional 
activities; creating an appropriate and 
effective legal and regulatory framework; 
capacity building programmes for potential 
suppliers that include training and quality 
assurance; and the wider role of business 
support services and other intermediaries 
that might include partner searching 
facilities.  
Policies need to pay attention to the broader 
business environment in developing 
countries that affects both SME 
development and their ability to attract FDI; 
to making SMEs more attractive as business 
partners for inward investing enterprises; 
and to a strategy for encouraging this type of 
co-operation. In this regard, Morisset (2000) 
has underlined the importance of reforms 
aimed at increasing macroeconomic 
stability, democracy and a commitment to 
economic reforms. At the same time, 
Morisset (op cit) stresses the importance of 
high profile publicity efforts, aimed at 
informing potential investors of 
improvements in the business environment, 
on the basis that potential investors need to 
have an up-to-date and accurate picture of 
the contemporary business environment, 
rather than one based on (negative) 
perceptions inherited from the past. 
Backward linkages with suppliers have 
traditionally been seen as the main vehicle 
to promote technological and other 
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spillovers from MNEs into host economies. 
In this regard, some governments have 
sought to impose domestic content 
requirements on inward investors, in order 
to increase market opportunities for local 
firms. However, the increasing liberalisation 
of investment rules, combined with practical 
problems of implementing such measures, 
and the possible disincentive effect on 
potential investors, means that such 
mandatory supplier requirements are 
declining in importance. Moreover, in a 
context where the competition for FDI is 
becoming increasingly fierce, there is a risk 
that mandatory measures may discourage 
MNCs from investing at all. As a 
consequence, the current policy challenge is 
to exploit the development potential of local 
supplier networks through voluntary means, 
although some attempt to building the 
capacity of local SMEs to supply is almost 
certainly required, facilitated by 
intermediaries, as well as by active 
promotion. A recent example is the Uganda 
Business Linkages Promotion Programme, 
which was initiated in July 2003 by Unilever 
to encourage the development of linkages 
between MNEs, large local enterprises and 
local SMEs (UNCTAD, 2003).  
 
Finally, developing policies to encourage 
and facilitate SME development in 
developing countries through FDI linkages 
requires co-ordinated actions on a number of 
fronts, involving various partners including 
policy makers in developed countries; those 
in transition and developing countries; 
donors and international organisations; FDI 
enterprises; and SMEs in transition and 
developing countries 
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